INTRODUCTION
When he was convicted in 1994 of drunken driving, escape, and re sisting arrest, Ronald Yeskey was sentenced to serve 18 to 36 months in a Pennsylvania prison.1 In addition, the judge recommended that Yeskey be sent to a motivational boot camp operated by the state.2 Upon successful completion of the boot camp program, Y eskey's sen tence would then be reduced to six months.3 Although he eagerly wanted to participate, the prison refused him entrance into the boot camp program because of his history of hypertension, and also denied him admission into an alternative program for the disabled.4 As a re sult, he was incarcerated for two years and two months longer than he might have been had he successfully completed the boot camp.5 Yes key filed suit in federal court, charging that prison authorities had violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)6 by discriminating against him due to his physical condition.7
On June 15, 1998 , that suit reached the Supreme Court. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey8 the Court resolved a long-runnin g circuit split in holding that Title II of the ADA applies to inmates in state prisons.9 The Court concluded that Ronald Yeskey's claim under the Act should not have been barred due to his status as a prisoner.10
The Yeskey decision promises to have far-reaching legal conse quences. It has prompted many commentators to predict a flood of lawsuits from disabled prisoners.11 The Court's ruling was lauded by of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Until Yeskey's case was decided by the Supreme Court, it had been unclear whether state prisons fell under the statutory definition of a public entity.
7. See Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1997 ).[hereinafter Yeskey 1] (summ arizing the circuit split on this issue).
8. 118 S. Ct. 1952 Ct. (1998 [hereinafter Yeskey 11]. 9. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia confirmed that such prisons fall "squarely" within the definition of a "public entity" for purposes of the ADA. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1953-54. In doing so, he rejected petitioner's claims that the phrase "benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity," 42 U.S.C. § 12132, created an ambiguity because state prisons do not provide prisoners with "benefits" of "pro grams, services or activities" as those terms are usually understood. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court found instead that " [m] odem prisons provide inmates with many recreational 'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'pro grams,' all of which at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners." Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955.
The Court also disagreed with petitioner's claim that the description of a " 'qualified in dividual with a disability' " under Title II, which requires the individual to meet " 'the essen tial eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or ac tivities provided by a public entity' " was ambiguous relative to state prisoners. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court rejected the idea that the words " 'eligibility' " or " 'participation' " implied voluntariness on the part of an applicant under the Act, and thus would not include prisoners who are being held against their will . See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court held that the definitions of these words "do not con note voluntariness." Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955.
10. Unfortunately for Yeskey himself, the inmate was unable to personally benefit from the fruits of the litigation he began. By the time his case was listed for submission in the Third Circuit, only a short time remained on his sentence. See Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118 F.3d at 169. Ultimately he was released in October of 1996 after serving 36 months in Greensburg prison in western Pennsylvania and is now a construction worker in the Pitts burgh region. See Torry, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Laurie Asseo, Justices Declare Fe deral Disabilities Act Protects Prison In mates, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), June 16, 1998, at 7 (" 'I expect a lot of creative litiga tion on the part of prisoners,' said Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Founda tion, which supported Pennsylvania officials' appeal. 'We're now opening another floodgate.' "); Barrie Tabin, Unanimous Supreme Court Says ADA Applies to Prison In mates, NATION'S CrTIEs WKLY., June 22, 1998, at 1 ("As a result of the Court's ruling, such fundamental decisions as allocating jobs in prison industries, spaces in educational and voca tional training programs, recreational opportunities, and other institutional privileges are likely to prompt costly and fact intensive lawsuits second-guessing the decisions of prison administrators."); Steven Walters, Fe deral Disabilities Act Covers State In mates, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 16, 1998, at 8 ("The high court's conclusion that the ADA (Vol. 98:482 others as a victory for the disabled prison population, as it may pro vide a mechanism for inmates to improve correctional conditions re garding diverse issues, such as the physical protection of disabled in mates12 or the reform of prison healthcare systems.13 Yet for all of the fanfare it received, Yeskey failed to address an equally consequential issue that has the potential to blunt the force of the Supreme Court's ruling significantly: the level of judicial scrutiny that prisoners' ADA claims should receive.
Prior to 1987, Procunier v. Martinez14 was the Supreme Court's most significant decision regarding the scrutiny afforded to alleged violations of prisoners' constitutional rights. In Procunier, the Court held that censorship of prisoner mail would only be justified if the regulation or practice in question furthered "an important or substan tial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,"
and if "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [were] no greater than [was] necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."15 This type of review is similar to the kind of "heightened scrutiny" that classifications based on gender re ceive -those that will not be upheld unless they are "substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest."16 Yet in a 1987 case, Turner v. Safley, 17 the Court made it more diffi cult for a prisoner to succeed with a claim that his or her constitutional covers state prisons disposes of a major impediment to those suits and is expected to encour age new cases."). 12 See Jordan Lite, State Admits Disabled Prisoners We re Discriminated Against, Vows Changes, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 12, 1998, at A4. 13. See Sp lit Down the Right, NATION, July 20, 1998, at 3. 14. 416 U.S. 396 {1974).
15. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).
16. Sandra J. Carnahan, The Americans with Disabilities Act in State Correctional Insti tutions, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 315 (1999) 
(quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 {1985)). There are three traditional levels of judicial scrutiny that are undertaken by courts. The most searching is "strict scrutiny," which can be satisfied only if the classification in question is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
See Carnahan, supra. This level of review is used to examine classifications based on "sus pect status," such as race or religion. See id. The next level is "heightened scrutiny" of the kind used in Procunier. The least stringent level of review is the use of a "rational basis" test, under which classifications will be sustained if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See id. For more discussion of how these levels of review affect the correc tional environment, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
17. 482 U.S. 78 {1987). At issue in the case was a challenge to two regulations in effect at a Missouri correctional institution. The first, in most cases, only permitted correspon dence between prisoners in different facilities if the "classification/treatment team" of each inmate allowed it. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81-82. The second permitted an inmate to marry only with the pemtission of the superintendent of the prison, and provided that such ap proval should be given only when there were compelling reasons to do so. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
rights were being infringed upon by a prison regulation. In that case, the Court limited the Procunier holding to the narrow context of cor respondence between prisoners and the general public.1 8 The Tu rner majority concluded that subjecting all judgments of prison officials to this type of heightened scrutiny would "seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration."1 9 The Court went on to articulate four factors relevant in determining the "reasonable ness" of the prison regulation at issue: (1) whether there is a valid, ra tional connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitu tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the alloca tion of prison resources generally, and (4) whether ready alternatives to the regulation exist.20
Since the Turner decision, it has generally been clear that a prison regulation that allegedly infringes upon an inmate's constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological in terest.21 The Turner Court specifically rejected the use of heightened scrutiny in examining the efficacy of the prison regulation, instead re quiring that a disputed regulation satisfy only the lowest level of scru tiny that could be imposed by courts. 22 First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion). Perhaps the most oft-used example of a legitimate penological interest is a prison security concern. For example, in the Tu rner case itself, restrictions on inmate correspondence were promulgated due to the correctional administration's belief that, by restricting these communications, prisons would combat the growing problem of prison gang membership. See Tu rner, 482 U.S. at 91. The Supreme Court found this prohibition "logically connected to these legitimate security concerns."
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. 22 See supra note 16; see also Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("But the similarity between Safley's phrasing and the language of rational basis review sug gests to us that ... Safley's standard is, if not identical, something very similar.").
[ Vol. 98:482 Tu rner, however, made no mention of the statutory rights of pris oners, nor did it discuss whether cases implicating those rights would also be subject to the deferential standard of review it outlined for cases involving constitutional rights violations. This question has not been resolved uniformly by the circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit, in a case involving a statutory claim under the Rehabilitation Act, applied the same standard of review defined in Tu rner for the review of consti tutional rights in a prison setting.23 The Court believed that it was "highly doubtful" that Congress intended a more stringent application of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Rehabilitation Act than the Court would afford to their constitutional rights.24 The Fourth Circuit has agreed, noting that due to the leeway that prison officials are accorded where their actions threaten inmates' constitu tional rights, "it follows a fo rtiori that prison officials enjoy similar flexibility with respect to inmates' statutory rights."25
In contrast, some circuit courts have shied away from using the REP. 57 (1994) ("Prior to Gates, Turner was not used to interpret statutory rights.").
24. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447; see also Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (agreeing with the Gates reasoning).
25. Torcasio v. Murray, 57F.3d 1340 , 1355 (4th Cir. 1995 .
26. One circuit court has identified the question of whether principles of deference to the decisions of prison officials in the context of constitutional law apply to statutory rights, but has not decided it. In the case leading to the Supreme Court's Yeskey decision, the Third Circuit "flagged" the question, but did not determine whether Tu rner applies to statu tory rights generally or to ADA claims in particular. See Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118 F.3d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1997 ) (taking note of the "controversial and diffi cult question whether principles of deference to the decisions of prison officials in the context of constitutional law apply to statutory rights" and noting that it was "not sure of the answer").
27. See Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F.3d 1355 , 1357 (8th Cir. 1995 Ct 1952 Ct , 1954 Ct (1998 (holding that the ADA's language "unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage").
35. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.l(a) (1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l), (3) (stating that it is the intent of the Act "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities " and "to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing [those] standards").
36. Title II of the ADA requires that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, poli cies or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). This Note focuses on Title II of the ADA because it plays the most prominent role in prisoner litigation under the Act, while Titles I, III, IV, and V have only limited application for prison inmates. For an excellent summary of the potential scope of the ADA regarding prisoner claims, see Robbins, supra note 6, at 76-81. mendous financial or administrative burdens for correctional facilities. This Note concludes that administering the ADA in this way would provide disabled prisoners with a more evenhanded adjudication of their discrimination claims, while also respecting the legitimate con cerns of prison administration. Second, many courts have refused to apply the Turner standard to prisoners' claims emanating from discrimination based on a "suspect classification." The Supreme Court has ruled that when a state classi fies by race, alienage, or national origin, these factors are seldom rele vant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest and may often reflect prejudice and antipathy. As a result, laws containing these classifications are subjected to "strict scrutiny" and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.45 Other classifications, sometimes referred to as "quasi-suspect," also call for a heightened standard of review, though not as stringent as the aforementioned groups. These include classifying by gender, which must be substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest,46 and illegitimacy, which must be substantially related to a le gitimate state interest.47 Courts have agreed that inmates' claims of discrimination rising as a result of their status as a member of a "sus pect class" should receive this type of heightened review, specifically in cases involving gender discrimination48 or racial discrimination.49 Presumably other suspect classifications, such as discrimination based on alienage and national origin, would also receive more rigorous re view in the prison context under this line of argument.50
Third, courts and commentators have recognized that some per sons who are associated with the penal system, but have a greater ex pectation of liberty due to their unique circumstances, should also re ceive a heightened level of review for their constitutional rights claims. This argument has arisen regarding the claims of probationers and pa rolees,51 the actions of duly admitted attorneys within prison con- ing for limitations on illegitimate children in seeking child support that were not present for legitimate children). Though the test for classifications based on illegitimacy is slightly dif ferent than that for classifications based on gender, the Supreme Court has ruled that ille gitimacy also holds quasi-suspect status. Such classifications are subject to "more" than ra tional basis review -what the Court has termed "a realm of less than strictest scrutiny." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) .
48. See, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995 ) (unsure whether Turner should automatically apply to case questioning whether male and female inmates could by deemed similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 , 1230 (9th Cir. 1994 fines,52 and with respect to management of conditions in county or municipal jails designed primarily to house individuals charged with but not convicted of criminal offenses.53
Fourth, courts have indicated that the Tu rner standard should not apply to Eighth Amendment claims because rights under that Amendment apply only to inmates, and therefore courts would have no justification for lessening its protection in prison facilities. For ex ample, the Ninth Circuit argued that "Turner has been applied only where the constitutional right is one enjoyed by all persons, but the exercise of which may necessarily be limited due to the unique circum stances of imprisonment."54 In contrast, the court held that Eighth Amendment rights do not conflict with incarceration but simply limit the hardships that can be inflicted upon the incarcerated as "punish ment. "55 Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has never ap plied Turner to an Eighth Amendment case.56
These cases demonstrate that with regard to the constitutional rights of prisoners, despite the language used in Tu rner and its prog eny, there is a fairly broad consensus that the Tu rner test should not apply in all constitutional rights cases. While some, but certainly not all , cases of infringements on prisoners' statutory rights under the ADA would meet one of these exceptions,57 these cases are significant Hall, 839 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 {D. Or. 1993) {"With certain exceptions, notably the Eighth Amendment, the Turner framework applies in approaching all claims in which it is asserted that a particular prison practice or rule implicates constitutional rights.").
56. See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530 (implying that because the Supreme Court had never applied Tu rner in this way, the Court would agree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion).
57. Even if each noted exception were accepted by the Supreme Court, a large number of prisoner ADA cases would still implicate Tu rner. For example, it can first be acknowl edged that while some prisoner ADA claims have no bearing on matters of inmate behavior or institutional order and security, in many cases the prison regulations which lead to in mates' ADA claims are promulgated because of such concerns, and would therefore not be subject to this exemption.
Second, the Supreme Court has ruled that the disabled are not a "suspect class" and that claims of discrimination based on disability should not automatically receive strict scrutiny. it should also apply to an inmate's statutory rights.60 Yet a number of factors involving the nature of statutory rights in general and the ADA in particular persuasively argue for a different conclusionthat the impact of the ADA should not be significantly diluted in pris ons by granting extreme deference to the decisions of prison adminis trators. This Part argues that courts must distinguish between constithat discriminating against a blind person is like discriminating against a black person, it is not obvious that the prison may exclude the blind person from the dining hall ... ");Torry, supra note 1, (reporting that in oral argument in the Yeskey case, Justice O'Connor was skeptical of the argument that the state can deny inmates certain rights and asked the defen dant's attorney: "Do you think that this court would sanction a policy that black prisoners have to eat in separate dining rooms?").
Third, there is little doubt that almost all prison ADA claims are brought by inmates themselves, and not those groups of people associated with the prison environment but who nonetheless have a greater expectation of liberty. See supra notes 51-5 3 and accompanying text. And lastly, the provisions of the ADA are not rights that can only be claimed by pris oners, unlike Eighth Amendment claims. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
58. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gates seemed not to recognize any reason, short of a Congressional mandate to the contrary, why review of prisoner claims made pursuant to statutory rights should differ from the standard applicable to constitutional rights. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 14 39, 1447 (1994) ("It is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more stringent application of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act than it would the prisoners' constitutional rights. Thus, we deem the applicable standard ... to be equivalent to the review ... in Turner v. Safley."). In contrast, this Note provides many reasons why statutory rights in general and the ADA in particular provide a compelling rationale to abandon Turner in ADA cases and defer to the "reasonable modification" language of the Act's Title II in addressing claims. See [Vol. 98:482 tutional rights•and such statutory rights as those provided in the ADA in order to (1) conform to the intent of the Turner decision regarding the enhanced fact finding ability of the legislature and the centralized nature of its determinations, (2) acknowledge the flexibility of statu tory decision making as opposed to the creation of constitutional rights, and (3) rely on the specificity of statutes such as the ADA to address some problems of interpretation.
First, the rationales behind the Turner decision support a distinc tion between constitutional rights and rights provided by a legislative enactment such as the ADA. One important reason for the Turner policy of judicial deference was that courts are not well equipped to make decisions relating to the urgent problems of prison administra tion and reform.61 The Court specifically noted that:
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning and the commitment of resources, all of which are pe culiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of pow ers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.62
In passing the ADA, which creates a new set of statutory rights, the legislature has made exactly the type of reasoned determination that the Turner Court argued it was uniquely qualified to make.63
Through the ADA, Congress determined that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."64 Moreover, the Supreme Court has unambiguously 61. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 {1987).
62 Tu rner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (emphasis added) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 {1974)). The Supreme Court has also generally agreed that with regard to laws af fecting the disabled in particular, deference to Congress's investigative power is important.
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43 {"How this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legisla tors guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary."). Unlike courts, Congress has the ability to hold hearings regarding particular legislation, receive large amounts of witness testimony on the potential effects of a particular Act and spend long periods of time crafting that legislation -luxuries that are not generally available to the judicial branch.
63. See also Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1336 (recognizing that "although Tu rner serves to restrain the judiciary from interfering in prison matters, a job best left to the legislative and administrative branches, rights under the Rehabilitation Act emanate from those branches" (citations omitted)). Moreover, while Tu rner can be said to serve fed eralism concerns by keeping federal authority out of state prisons, unless it is clear that Con gress intended such an intrusion, see Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 , 1345 {4th Cir. 1995 69. Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 219 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that while its "defer ence to Congress must not be blind ... a great deal of deference must still be given to Con gress, especially in the face of a fully developed evidentiary record of discrimination"). The court also recognized that Congress did gather evidence in the past on arbitrary discrimina tion against the disabled in prisons. See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 219 n5. (Vol. 98:482 intended specifically to apply to correctional facilities. Congress's su perior factfinding ability is no less relevant and still far superior to that of the courts when it is used to devise statutes with broad mandates.
Moreover, the centralized nature of Congress's decision making regarding the ADA would also quell the Tu rner Court's fear that nu merous courts around the country would provide differing and con fusing mandates for prisons to follow. The Tu rner majority expressed this view by worrying that such rulings would "distort the decision making process" and subject every administrative judgment to the "possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand."70 Unlike a case implicating a constitutional right, a statutory rights case does not re quire the court itself to establish a set of guidelines that could have the effect of restricting a prison warden's flexibility. 73. The Tu rner Court did not indicate that Congress was more able than prison adminis trators to articulate workable solutions to prison problems -in fact it indicated that both were able to do so. See Tu rner, 482 U. S. at [84] [85] (noting that the problems of prisons are "peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches" as well as that "[w]here a state penal system is involved ... [there is] additional reason to afford deference to the appropriate prison authorities"). This argument merely identifies why Congress's in volvement makes statutes different from constitutional cases with respect to Tu rner's appli cation in prisons. The other arguments regarding the statute itself articulated in this Part, the arguments relating to the ADA's application in prisons in Part III, and the flexibility of the statute's "reasonable modification" language, noted in Part IV, all demonstrate more particularly why Turner should not be used in the ADA context. rights as the most "special" rights with which they are endowed, due to the respect that we afford to the Constitution's guarantee of liberties. Yet statutory rights have the advantage of providing guidance for prison administrators while also allowing for flexibility if a bill's provi sions become unworkable in the correctional environment. If a stat ute's guidelines are found to be unworkable in prisons, the legislative body can amend them to remedy those deficiencies and still retain the option to make further changes in the future. In contrast, once courts make constitutional rights determinations, those rulings cannot be overturned by the legislature.74 Moreover, these constitutional grants of liberty are also difficult to overrule within the courtroom, as courts prefer a stable body of law to one that constantly changes depending on the identity of judges on the bench.75 As a result of the greater flexibility they provide to the legislature to address weaknesses in the correctional environment, statutory rights should be granted greater application than are constitutional rights for inmates.
Th ird, legislation such as the ADA provides courts and prison ad ministrators with far greater detail than do grants of constitutional rights . While rules of constitutional law are unique in that they de pend entirely upon judicial decisions to determine their scope,76 legis lative determinations often have the ability to provide greater speci ficity in their text and are augmented by agency interpretations. Thus, the legislature is able to provide prison administrators with substantial guidance in attempting to ensure that their prison's regulations will meet legal standards regarding disabled prisoners.77 As with many other statutes, the ADA's provisions are supplemented by guidelines provided by governmental agencies, including the Department of Jus tice.78 In particular, it has been stated that "the text of the ADA was 74. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress ex ceeded its authority under the Enforcement Oause of the Fourteenth Amendment in en acting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). It has been recognized that Boerne ex plained that "[ o ]nee the Court clearly pronounced the appropriate level of scrutiny for equal protection analysis, Congress lost the power to raise the standard." Carnahan, supra note 16, at 316.
The Supreme Court stated in
Boerne that when Congress acts "against the back ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Car nahan, supra note 16, at 316.
76. See Raines, 987 F. Supp. at 1420.
77. The relative inability of courts to provide more than minimal instruction to correc tional facilities seemed to be exactly the concern of the Court in Turner when it worried that courts "would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every [prison] [Vol. 98:482 laden with detail" and that the standards for compliance are detailed "in literally hundreds of pages of specifications."79 The existence of ADA-related agency regulations, combined with the detail of the leg islation itself, provide exactly the type of specificity that the Tu rner Court generally supposed the legislative branches would supply. This provides further justification for the proposition that instead of relying on the Turner standard, a "judicially created test for judicially con strued rights," courts would better serve the policy of deference un derlying Tu rner by looking to these regulations and the text of the statute when possible if ambiguity exists.80
The nature of statutory rights in general, and of the ADA in par ticular, reveals some important reasons why courts should not simply defer to the decisions of prison administrators when inmates bring claims under the Act. These reasons demonstrate that arguments for the use of the Turner test in the constitutional rights setting, a realm of cases where the standard is not even incorporated in all instances, are even less persuasive when applied to grants of statutory rights to in mates. visions provide significant assistance for courts tltat is often not available in cases involving a constitutional rights dispute. Of course, reliance on tlte text of such a statute as tlte ADA and agency provisions will have its limits, as tltere will always be ambiguities tltat a court must resolve. See infra Section IV.A.
III . THE TURNER STANDARD 'S EFFECT
81. See Tu rner, 482 U.S. at 100 {Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that if tlte standard "can be satisfied by notlting more titan a 'logical connection' between tlte regulation and any le gitimate penological concern perceived by a cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless"). Courts examining tlte "legitimate penological interest" standard in recent years have contin ued to note tltat it is a "highly deferential standard." Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 , 1356 ( 4tlt Cir. 1995 ). This should not be surprising. Since one of tlte fundamental concerns of prison administration is to maintain tlte security and order of its prisons, almost any regula-"[a]pplication of the standard would seem to permit disregard for in mates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concem."82 In particular,, if this standard is applied to the review of potential ADA violations by prisons, "only the truly horrifying scenario of inmate abuse will have. a prospect for relief' under the Act.83 The Turner standard is so difficult to over come for prisoners bringing ADA claims because it: (1) allows secu rity concerns to gain an overwhelming importance not intended by the ADA, and (2) shifts the burden of justifying the restriction from the institution to the inmate, who must show that it is an overreaction.84
Additionally, courts have maintained that if the standard of review of the disabled prisoners' statutory claims is equivalent to the standard for constitutional claims, then it is obvious that the statute's protec tions make little difference in the prison context.85 Prior to the Yeskey decision, one court had even argued that the results of applying the Turner standard to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act inthe prison con text would mean that such claims would rarely succeed, and that this result was evidence that the statutes were not intended to apply to prisons at all.86 Of course, the Yeskey decision has since made it clear that these statutes do apply to state prisons. If the use of the Turner test would frustrate this ruling by making the ADA's application to prisons "unworkable," that result is evidence that such a standard should not be used.
Section III.A examines the practical effect of the use of the Turner standard in cases involving claims by disabled prisoners. It will do so by analyzing cases decided under the authority of the Ninth Circuit, which is one of only two circuits to have decided that the Turner stantion intended to make the daily routine of prison life run more smoothly might be justified by some type of security rationale. dard should apply to review of disabled prisoners' statutory claims.87 Ultimately, it will argue that this approach precluded prisoners from prevailing in their claims under the Rehabilitation Act,88 even when the justifications produced by prison administration were based on very weak evidence. Next, Section III.B will claim that the use of the Turner test effectively eliminates any consideration of the prisoner's disability or personal physical discomfort, focusing instead solely on the legitimacy of the prison rule involved. Only when a rule is deemed not to have a "legitimate penological interest" might any considera tion then be given to the inmate's disability. This procedural result has the effect of eliminating any consideration of the ADA's provi sions in a large number of inmate ADA cases -a result that is incon sistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in Yeskey that the Act should apply inside prison walls.
A The Damaging Results of the Ninth Circuit's Gates Decision
After the Ninth Circuit ruled that prisoners' claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act would be reviewed using the Tu rner standard, the circuit has consistently upheld the denial of those claims.89 The use of the deferential "legitimate penological interest" test has allowed weak rationales to prevail over prisoners' statutory rights, and provides a disturbing preview of the outcome of a potential Supreme Court decision that would validate the Tu rner standard for use in this context. One such rationale often employed in these cases argues that it is not the reality of the disability, but how that disability is perceived that should take precedence in Tu rner-based determina tions of claims by the disabled.90 This consequence is particularly un fortunate in light of the fact that Congress passed the ADA in part to change stereotypical assumptions made ab out the disabled that had no basis in fact.91 These cases also allow two other dangerous arguments to prevail under the Tu rner test: that prisoners are ignorant and ab normal,92 and that solutions should be implemented that punish the disabled inmate instead of protecting his rights.93 87. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d1439, 1447 {9th Cir. 1994 In Gates, for example, the defendants were excluded from serving fo od at their correctional facility because they were HIV-positive,94 despite the fact that the risks of a "prisoner acquiring HIV through food service are slight," amounting only to "theoretic possibilities."95
The court agreed with the argument that if HIV-positive prisoners were placed in these jobs, other prisoners would fear that they would bleed or spit into the food -and that such fears would lead to vio lence.96 The prison's argument that many inmates "are not necessarily motivated by rational thought" and frequently have irrational phobias "that education will not modify" succeeded in satisfying the Tu rner test.97
Similarly, in Bullock v. Gomez,98 a prisoner with HIV was denied an overnight visit with his wife. The prison administration claimed this was because "theoretical[ly ]" such visits could cause fear in other prisoners that they "'might be exposed to the disease by the subse quent family visitors," and that these concerns, even if they had no va lidity, could result in violence because inmates have "different ways of dealing with their concerns than regular people. "99 The prison made this argument although the warden admitted that this was "not a sig nificant security issue"100 and that no prisoners had ever previously obj ected to such visitors.101 The court, though refusing to grant sum- 101. See id. at 1306-07 (warden testifying that he was unaware of any instance where prisoners were unwillin g to use a family visiting trailer after a prisoner known to have HIV used it, or where a prisoner had objected to assignment to a cell formerly occupied by an HIV-positive inmate).
[Vol. 98:482 mary judgment to the defendant, held that these theoretical claims need not to be shown to have caused past violence to be successful under Turner.
In Fo wler v. Gomez,102 the plaintiff was on crutches103 and was not allowed to be fed outside the infirmary unless he carried his own food tray. Prison officials had thrown away plaintiff's food when he had not followed this regulation, forcing him to forage food from the trash can to feed himself. 109. See id. at *2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it is rational to prevent tnis conduct by punishing the potential victim rather than those who tnisbehave."). The dissent also believed that the prison provided no justification for its other security claim, that Martinez's medical condition requires him to be closely monitored by hospital staff in the infirmary. See id. at *2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (finding that "nothing about Martinez's daily condition" requires this). Prison officials tnight claim that in light of the Supreme Court's affirmation, in Farmer v. Brennan, of the principle that prisons have a duty to protect pris oners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) , these restric tions are necessary to accomplish that goal. Yet the same goal tnight often be accomplished just as effectively by affirm atively providing protection for the prisoner, instead of restricting his opportunities within the prison. If such protection constituted a legitimately serious bur den for the prison, it would be free to make such a showing under the AD A's regulations by arguing that the suggested modification to the prison routine was "unreasonable." See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994); see also infra Section IV.A.
These cases show that when courts have used the Tu rner test to re view inmates' ADA claims, the standard has been met by arguments that rely on stereotypes of a prisoner's disability, claims that prisoners are ignorant and irrational, and focus on the security needs of the prison without making a serious effort to accommodate the prisoner's needs. The unfortunate outcomes of these cases should give courts pause before implementing a standard that promotes results that stig matize and restrict the rights of inmates due to their disabilities.
B. A Misguided Fo cus on the Standard, No t the Disabled Inmate
Another practical result of the use of Tu rner in the review of pris oner ADA claims is that the use of the standard often eliminates any consideration of the prisoner's disability, the basis for his claim under the ADA, from being used as a factor in the judicial determination of that claim. In the cases examined in the Ninth Circuit, if a regulation was deemed to meet the Tu rner standard, then the plaintiff's ADA claim was terminated.U0 Although the prisoner's claim is brought un der a statute protecting the disabled from discrimination, the court's focus remains solely on the prison's justification of its regulation until the case is dismissed. In these cases, no examination of the plaintiff's disability is attempted, nor are the provisions of the ADA itself dis cussed or implicated. Thus, only if a plaintiff were successful in showing that a prison regulation was unrelated to a "legitimate pe nological interest" would his or her ADA-related claim be examined in any detail. And because that outcome would occur so infrequently, 110. There seems to be some confusion as to what would occur if a prison regulation did not meet the Tu rner test. The Eleventh Circuit has assumed that if the Tu rner test was not satisfied by a prison then the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act would be applied, and a prisoner must also meet the standards of that Act to succeed in his claim. See Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL 474106, at *11 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1996 vacated en bane Sept. 20, 1996; See Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1335 (assum ing that Tu rner would be used in conjunction with a test determining whether the plaintiff could prove he or she was "otherwise qualified" under the Act). Alternatively, another court believed that Gates stood for the proposition that Tu rner mandated the use of a stan dard of "deliberate indifference to a serious medical need," which it noted was the same standard that would be applied if the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were not applied to prisons. See Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 806 n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (citing Farmer v. Brellll an, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). The Callaway court did not define whether such a standard would be used in place of the four factors described in Turner, or applied after a plaintiff met those factors. Yet it has been argued that given the generally objective presen tation of the ADA's requirements, the use of "deliberate indifference" test would not be appropriate. This is because the element of intent to be indifferent to the medical need, which is crucial for that test, is likely not a required element for prevailing claims under the ADA. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 91. Additionally, "deliberate indifference" is often an important element in Eighth Amendment claims, which may not be subject to the Turner test at all. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. [Vol. 98:482 the practical outcome of invoking Tu rner in these scenarios would be that the ADA would have strikingly little effect in prisons.
These results frustrate the intent of the ADA, as individuals are discriminated against because of their disability and yet are often not allowed to have that disability or the prospect of reasonable modifica tion under the ADA emerge as a factor in the judicial process. This outcome seems particularly unfortunate in light of the history of pris ons, such as those in the Ninth Circuit, which have admitted to serious violations of the rights of disabled prisoners.111 In the face of such violations112 and the protection afforded by the ADA in general, a standard of review that does not allow disabled prisoners the ability to have the ADA's provisions considered by the court is a misguided one.
IV. CONSIDERING TIIB PRISON CONTEXT AS P ART OF TIIB
AD A'S CALCULUS
This Note has argued that, for a number of reasons, it would be in appropriate to use the Tu rner standard in adjudicating prisoners' claims under the ADA. As an alternative to that standard, Section IV.A suggests that courts should analyze the justifications surrounding a challenged prison regulation as part of its "reasonable modification" deliberations under Title II of the Act.113 In this way, the statute could 111. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, State Prisons Settle Disability Bias Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 1998, at A20 (reporting that the state of California admitted violating the ADA and the U.S. Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by allowing a broad range of abuses in its prisons, including the knifing and rape over a two-week period of a San Diego prisoner with an IQ of fifty-six who complained to guards that he was in danger, and the taunting and punishing of disabled prisoners by guards throughout the state's thirty-two prison system); Jordan Lite, State Admits Disabled Prisoners We re Discriminated Against, Vows Changes, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 12, 1998 at A4 (reporting that state prison abuses also included having disabled prisoners given longer prison terms after not being as sisted during hearings to establish their guilt or innocence); see also Maura Dolan, Judge Or ders End to Brutality at High -Tech Prison, L.A. T.IMEs, Jan. 12, 1995, at Al (reporting that a federal district judge determined that the state of California permitted guards at Pelican Bay Prison to exercise " 'grossly excessive' force" and that the facility denied adequate medical and mental-health care to inmates, leading to deaths).
112. It is of course true that a similar argument might be made regarding the abuses that could arise in the use of the Turner test in cases involving infringement of prisoners' consti tutional rights. It is not the intent of this Section to claim that those unfortunate conse quences are not significant for prisoners as well. Yet aside from the previously noted rea sons why the protection of inmates' statutory rights might differ from that afforded to their constitutional rights, there is another reason why the results of prisoner ADA claims, gov erned by Turner, might seem more egregious than those in the constitutional rights context. The reason is that there is something abhorrent about the notion that a prisoner's disability, which in many cases is already a severe physical and emotional burden, should be a signifi cant justification as to why the inmate must be further penalized in the prison environment.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (stating under the Act that a "qualified individual with a disability" is one "who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or provide a mechanism for courts to protect prisoners' rights while also considering the needs of the correctional administration. Section IV.B maintains that greater judicial scrutiny need not cause either tremen dous organizational disruption or large financial burdens for prisons. Instead, this Section provides evidence that prisons have adapted to handle the needs of disabled prisoners and counters the notion that a different standard of review will result in a large amount of damaging prisoner litigation.
A A Better Alternative to the Turner Standard
In light of the difficulties that accompany the Turner standard, some courts have suggested that the ADA claims of prisoners should be treated no differently than those of non-prisoners, without ad dressing the reality of the claimant's incarceration.114 Yet this ap proach would ignore the reality, often underscored by the Supreme Court, that prisons have special security needs and that due to the na ture of prison life, inmates simply do not have the same freedoms as non-inmates do.115
A more appropriate solution would be for courts to incorporate the unique circumstances of prison life into their determinations under the Act. In particular, in deciding whether a reasonable modification exists in a particular dispute, a deliberation required by the ADA,116 the court would be able to take into account concerns regarding secu rity and order often raised by correctional administration.117
Unlike the deferential Turner standard, which only requires the prison to make the minimal and often theoretical showing that a repractices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the par ticipation in programs or activities provided by a public entity").
114. See Raines v. Florida, 987 F Supp. 1416 , 1420 (N.D. Fla. 1997 (claiming that the ADA should not be interpreted with any "added judicial gloss").
115. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) .
116. See supra note 11 3 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Amos I, supra note 86, 126 F.3d at 600 (noting that in determining what type of scrutiny applies to violations of prisoners' statutory rights, courts will be outlining the meaning of key ADA terms such as reasonable accommodation and undue burden); Craw ford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 48 3 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguing that when a prisoner makes a claim, "a prison might be able to show that there was no reasonable ac commodation that would have enabled the plaintiff to participate in the programs and activi ties in question or that making the necessary accommodation would place an undue burden on the prison system"); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497 , 1510 (E.D. Mich. 1996 (arguing that the application of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act would not bring about "horrors" and that a modification which would seriously jeopardize the security of other inmates or prison officials would not be reasonable). [Vol. 98:482 striction serves a legitimate penological interest,118 this type of review would be more rigorous in protecting the statutory rights of inmates under the Act. This is because the ADA's key provisions do not focus solely on the justifications offered by the prison managers, but instead first seek to ensure equal treatment among disabled and non-disabled inmates.119 This "reasonable modification" approach therefore forces courts to look beyond the necessity of the restriction to the prison, which is Turner's focus, and also seriously consider the depth of the inmate's physical or mental concerns.
Additionally, by allowing for a balancing of the claims of prisoners and prison administration, the ADA addresses the requirement of the Turner and Procunier Courts that the difficulties of correctional ad ministration and security be considered when reviewing inmate litiga tion cases. In fact, the ADA not only allows for the consideration of the concerns of the public entity, required by cases such as Tu rner and Procunier, it mandates judicial consideration of interests particular to the prison system.120 Therefore, the ADA would require that correc tional facilities show that a particular modification sought by a dis abled inmate is unreasonable in the context of prison life and there fore not required under the Act. Moreover, in providing a centralized set of regulations augmented by agency interpretations and other ju risprudence surrounding the Act, Congress has given courts the tools to make reasoned decisions regarding application of the ADA in prison facilities.121 As a result, by addressing inmates' claims under the ADA, courts would be focusing on the nature of an inmate's disability while balancing those claims with the needs of correctional administra tion, as the Act requires.
At least one commentator has suggested that judges will have little difficulty in incorporating the ADA into the prison context because they can simply use guidelines written by the Department of Justice regarding the Act in addressing conflicts that arise in court.122 While 118. See supra Section III.A.
119. In requiring a determination of whether a proposed "modification" is "reason able," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), the ADA looks closely at the nature of the disability at issue and whether the prisoner's claim for relief can be acco=odated by means that do not subject the prison to unworkable hardship.
120. See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 220; Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1336. Moreover, it has been noted that the goals of prisons and those of statutes like the Rehabilitation Act need not be very different -a viewpoint that considers such legislation a benefit to the mission of prisons, not a hindrance. See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T] he Act's goals of independent living and vocational rehabilitation should in fact mirror the goals of prison officials as they attempt to rehabilitate prisoners and pre pare them to lead productive lives once their sentences are complete.").
See supra Parts II & III.
these guidelines will no doubt be determinative in some situations,123 there will be others in which courts will have to make determinations regarding what constitutes a "reasonable modification" that cannot be so obviously addressed by such regulations.124 In some situations then, courts will be the sole arbiters articulating solutions to prison prob lems -a concern of the Turner court.125 Yet in clearly establishing that prisoners should have the right to bring ADA claims, the Su preme Court itself has indicated that to some degree courts will have to act as mediator in these disputes.126 In these situations, due to the nature of statutory rights and the results of the use of the Turner test for disabled inmates, a court's role as mediator should be greater than that required by Turner.121
It might be argued that the use of this judicial approach would be different than the use of Turner, because courts would be equally def erential to prison administration regardless of the type of review that is used.128 Some courts have identified this concern without clearly an swering it -while arguing that using the "reasonable modification" test would not bring ab out "horrors" for prisons, they do not indicate whether such a standard would likely be more prisoner-protective than Turner.129 While it is no doubt true that some judicial decisions using the ADA's text would not differ from outcomes that incorpo rated Turner's standard, many others might diff er significantly, due to the increased emphasis placed on the nature of the disability under the ADA.130 Unlike those cases using the Turner standard, with this ap- 124. See Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note 51, at 867 (noting that the ADA "invites ju dicial interpretation by requiring public entities to implement 'reasonable' modifications with little statutory guidance as to what constitutes an 'unreasonable' modification").
125. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) .
126. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. a. 1952 , 1955 ; see also Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 222 ("Certainly tbere will be conflicts between the views of the DOJ and prison authorities with respect to what is a 'reasonable accommodation,' but it is and always has been the job of the courts to reconcile such conflicting interpretations by considering all the unique surrounding facts and circumstances and attempting to balance the interests at stake in making the ultimate statutory interpretation.").
127. See supra Parts II-III.
128. See Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL 474106, at *11 n.15 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1996 vacated en bane Sept 20, 1996 (maintaining that although a court can best express a degree of deference to prison officials through the framework of the Act, that approach would very likely make little difference in practice from the use of the Tu rner test).
129. See Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497 , 1510 (E.D. Mich. 1996 ; see also Love v. Westville Correctional Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1996) .
130. See supra Section III.B; see also Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 228 (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that by using the text of the Act instead of Tu rner to judge inmates' ADA claims, courts would likely be using a procedure akin to intermediate scrutiny, which [Vol. 98:482 proach courts would immediately investigate the nature of the in mate's disability and the alleged infringement on his or her rights. In stead of dismissing a large number of claims based solely on the le gitimacy of the prison's explanation,131 courts would be taking an approach to review which incorporates the ADA's concerns along with the prison's -an approach that could only give prisoners a somewhat greater chance at a successful outcome.132
Moreover, even if a prisoner does not succeed in a claim where the court uses the text of the ADA itself in its review, he or she has al ready won a symb olic battle. While concrete relief may not arise from the lawsuit, the inmate has forced the judicial and correctional systems to confront his or her statutory claim head on, and at least consider the seriousness of the claimed disability. In contrast, the Tu rner test often allows courts to reject an inmate's ADA claim without ever con sidering the nature of the disability.133
B. Why a High er Level of Scrutiny Will Not Substantially Burden Prison Administration
If this type of approach to inmates' ADA claims is adopted, there is evidence to suggest that prisons will be equipped to handle the re quirements placed upon them by inmate litigation. Correctional insti tutions would be able to survive a change to the review of ADA claims in a manner that is slightly more inmate-friendly than the use of Turner due to (1) the requirements of the Act itself, (2) the efforts of prisons to adapt to the ADA, and (3) the creative techniques that such facilities are increasingly using to support disabled inmates.
Some critics have claimed that prison populations contain a much greater percentage of persons with an ADA-covered disability134 than would require "searching judicial scrutiny of state law" (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. SW (1997))).
131. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
132 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 , 1527 (11th Cir. 1991 ) (suggesting that the ef fect of incorporating the Rehabilitation Act into decisions regarding prisons would be to provide a "balance" between inmate and administration concerns that would sometimes re sult in "reasonable accommodations" being made for prisoners). Moreover, when making the argument that use of the ADA text would not prove an unreasonable burden for prisons, some courts use only examples of situations where modifications "seriously" jeopardize prison interests in describing the types of changes that those facilities would not be required to make. See Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1336; Niece, 941 F. Supp. at 1510. This might indicate the courts' belief that situations where the modification is not insubstantial, but does not carry such dangerous prison concerns, might offer the opportunity for a plain tiff to be successful in court.
133. See supra Section ill .B.
134. The ADA defines a "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substan tially limits one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) . the population at large, implying that this large block of disabled pris oners would flood the courts with ADA-related litigation after the Yeskey decisionP5 Yet comprehensive studies delineating the extent of the disabled prison population have not been done,136 and what con stitutes a "disability" under the ADA is constantly being defined by courts -at times in ways that significantly narrow the class.137 With regard to physical disabilities, there is at least some evidence that dis abled prisoners are in fact not extraordinarily numerous.138 Moreover, at least one observer has noted that there has not been a barrage of prisoner lawsuits since the ADA's passage.139 On the other hand, in mates might be seen as more likely than non-inmates to claim a men tal disability, which is covered by the ADA with some exceptions,140 138. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 136, at 176-77 (reporting on a study that indicated that an average of 0.46% of inmates in the fe deral prison system had "ambulation problems," and that 0.46% of inmates used wheelchairs or had mobility problems); Maura Vol. 98:482 due either to the nature of their incarceration or a perception that someone convicted of criminal acts is more likely to have some form of mental instability.
Moreover, even prior to Yeskey, it had also long been argued that if prisoners were allowed to bring ADA claims, prisons would face substantial and potentially crippling financial and administrative diffi culties.141 The Third Circuit believed that such a ruling might "place nearly every aspect of prison management into the court's hands for scrutiny" and make it not unfathomable that "courts will be used to reconstruct cells and prison space, to alter scheduling of inmate movements and assignments and to interfere with security proce dures. "142 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, argued that such a ruling might require costly modifications of prison facilities, which could curtail educational, recreational, and rehabilitative pro grams and leave all prisoners worse off.143 These potential ramifica tions have been described as having "serious implications"144 and the potential to cause "chaos" for prisons.145 Furthermore, since the Su preme Court decided Yeskey, some prisons have wondered if they can survive the implementation of ADA-required alterations.146 These fears would presumably be exacerbated after a decision holding that those prisoner ADA claims would be subject to a more rigorous proc ess of judicial review than that provided by Tu rner.
Yet there are many reasons why a reliance on the text of the Act need not create instability for prisons, even if such a standard would increase the total number of claims and the amount that are success ful. First, the text of the ADA provides a number of hurdles for a claimant in order to achieve victory in a suit. Not only must the in mate prove that he or she has an ADA-covered disability, but the 141. Regardless of its truth, this is an argument that should be made to the legislature and not to the courts. If Congress allowed for the ADA to apply to prisons as Yeskey held, courts should not use these policy determinations to blunt the force of the statute. Congress has the ability to reformulate the law if these potentially dangerous consequences do arise. A court noted recently that Congress has to some degree already addressed the issue of frivolous prisoner litigation by enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996 . See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 216 n.4. 142. Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1997 DES MOINES REG., Feb. 15, 1998 at 1 (claiming that partly because many Iowa prisons are not meeting ADA standards, along with other problems, the future of many of those institutions is in jeopardy); Jim Smiley, Crumbling Jail to Fo rce One County's Ha nd, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 29, 1997, at 63 (reporting on a Nebraska prison that, due to its age, was not compliant with the ADA and most likely could not afford the $500 a day fee that other counties would charge to house its disabled prisoners).
modification that she proposes to the prison regulation must be "rea sonable. "147 A strict statute of limitations applies to these claims as well, as an inmate must file a complaint within 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination, or his or her suit will be barred.148 Addi tionally, the Act does not require that all programs and services be made available to disabled persons, meaning that while prisoners must have access to programs, that access need not be located at the par ticular prison itself. 149 Second, there is some evidence that prison compliance with the ADA need not be economically onerous if dealt with at an early stage.15° Moreover, many prisons have reported that the Yeskey deci sion did not have a debilitating impact for them because they had an ticipated that the ADA applied in the prison context,151 and because a great deal of new prison construction in the past few years has been (Vol. 98:482 ADA-compliant.152 If a greater number of prisons are designed to ad dress the needs of the disabled, the likelihood of a flood of litigation seems somewhat reduced. Third, state governments, individual prison facilities, and the courts are increasingly implementing creative solutions that make caring for the needs of disabled prisoners less costly and less disruptive to prison administration, also reducing the possibility for ADA-related claims. For example, some states provide their courts with significant discretion regarding where to house disabled prisoners -allowing them to place inmates in newer facilities that meet their needs while older buildings are made ADA-compliant.153 States have also begun to group prisoners with the same disability into one prison facility in an effort to provide assistance to them more easily as required by the ADA.154 Other options which have been tested are "compassionate parole" structures providing for early release of disabled prisoners155 and the transferring of disabled prisoners to appropriate medical fa cilities.156 Additionally, the judicial system attempts to keep the dis abled out of prison as much as possible, often by sympathetically citing the defendant's disability as a reason why no jail time should be im posed for an offense which would otherwise compel incarceration.157
As this Section demonstrates, there are a number of reasons not to expect that a more favorable standard of judicial review would result 152 See, e.g., Chorpening, supra note 151 ("Andrea Dean, spokeswoman for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, said all of Ohio's new prisons meet the act's guidelines .
•. "); Christopher Elser, Aging Behind Bars: Lengthy Jail Terms Ha ve Left PA with Costly Problem of Caring fo r Elderly Inmates, ALLE NTOWN MORNING CALL , Aug. 9, 1998, at Al; Locker & Duffy, supra note 138 (quoting the director of corrections for Shelby County in East Memphis as saying, "'Any new construction is ADA-complaint' "); Harkin, supra note 66, at 3 (reporting that the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections said, " 'We have been designing every new facility (in Iowa) with the appropriate openings, handi capped parking and other improvements. In those facilities, we're pretty close to being up to speed' ... "). 156. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 107. The author further states that while the ADA would bar such transfer if it achieved little more than convenient segregation of prisoners requiring extensive treatment, such strategies could be beneficial because they would leave societal concerns for security undisturbed and not result in a prisoner's transfer into the community. See id. at 108.
in onerous economic and administrative burdens for prisons. These legislative realities and administrative strategies will help correctional officials guard against procedural chaos and more easily avoid the po tential for a significant increase in prisoner claims, even if a more rig orous standard of review is implemented in ADA-related cases.158 CONCLUSION There is ample evidence that the Turner standard should not be applied in all cases involving the review of prisoner litigation; it should not be used where there are persuasive reasons supporting the imple mentation of another mechanism to review such claims . The judicial history of the Turner standard itself, the flexibility of statutory rights generally, and the specificity that accompanies statutes such as the ADA, all lead to a conclusion that the Turner standard is not appro priate for the review of inmates' statutory suits under the ADA.
Moreover, the results of using the Turner standard would preclude inmates from relief in all but the most horrible cases and divert atten tion from the claimants' disabilities. These consequences demonstrate that, courts should instead use the "reasonable modification" provi sion of the ADA in reviewing such claims. This result would, as man dated by the Supreme Court, provide disabled prisoners with an even handed adjudication of their discrimination claims, while also respecting the legitimate security concerns of prison administration. It would ensure that Ronald Yeskey's victory truly had meaning for those Americans with disabilities who live in the state prison system.
158. The aftermath in Pennsylvania of the Yeskey decision itself serves as an instructive example of how some of the mitigating factors mentioned here can help protect the state from unmanageable consequences of decisions favorable to prisoners' ADA claims. In Pennsylvania, the state has made sure that the most recent prisons it has built comply with the ADA, see Elser, supra note 152, which should help mitigate the cost of future compli ance with claims like Ronald Yeskey's. Pennsylvania had seven handicapped-accessible fa cilities in mid-1998, and new construction of such facilities was deemed not to be necessary.
See Schatz, supra note 4. Additionally, the state has been trying novel ways to manage dis abled prisoners' needs, by beginnin g to group prisoners with the same disability at specified institutions. See Elser, supra note 152. Additionally, another mitigating factor, which mate rialized in Pennsylvania after the Yes key decision, is the ability of the state's citizens to seek some redress in the state legislature. Governor Tom Ridge signed a bill into law making it more difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits by, among other things, providing the courts with an expanded ability to dismiss those suits that a judge considers frivolous. See Schatz, supra note 4. As long as such legislation does not hinder prisoners from bringing valid ADA claims, it is another means that can be used by the state to ensure that prisoner litigation does not spiral out of control.
